As if the economic downturn
s
if the economic downturn’s lingering fallout of layoffs, budget cutbacks and
sagging employee morale didn’t give human resources professionals enough to
worry about, there’s another dark cloud looming on the horizon: underfunded
pension plans.
The situation is ominous. Over the past three years,
thanks to the combination of a struggling stock market and low interest rates,
companies have seen the value of the stock and bond portfolios in which they’ve
invested their pension reserves plummet by nearly $1 trillion. The nation’s
corporate pension plans are $300 billion short of what they’ll eventually need
to cover the benefits for 44 million active and retired workers, according to
federal government estimates.
It’s a shortfall that threatens to wreak havoc with
corporate balance sheets and dangerously strain the federal government insurer
that backs up companies unable to make good on their pension commitments. But
while it’s obvious that something must be done about the pension-underfunding
crisis, nobody can agree on a solution. Congress is pondering controversial
changes to federal pension regulations that proponents say would make it easier
for companies to weather the crisis, though critics say the changes also might
ultimately leave pension plans even more dangerously short of money.
Meanwhile, millions of workers--some of whom have already
received unsettling notices informing them that their companies’ plans have
dipped below federal funding requirements--are left to worry about whether
they’ll have enough money to live comfortably in their retirement years. The
loss of worker confidence in pension plans could have a ripple effect, with a
negative impact on everything from recruiting and retention to succession
planning, according to compensation and retirement expert Brent Longnecker,
president of the Houston area-based Resources Consulting Group. "There’s been a
lot of focus on the financial side, but every way you look at it, this is a big
human resources problem as well." He says it’s crucial for human resources
leaders to plan for how they’re going to deal with potentially pervasive impacts
of pension underfunding, because the problem may well get worse before it gets
better.
Clearly, executives are already worried about the damage
that pension underfunding may cause to the overall health of their businesses.
In a recent survey of 151 companies by SEI Investments, a consulting firm in
suburban Philadelphia, 68 percent of the participants said the crisis had
already had a negative effect on corporate finances. Fifty-eight percent said
they’d posted lower profits as a result; and 75 percent were concerned about
future impacts ranging from cash-flow problems and lower profits to a decrease
in the value of company stock. Some prominent companies already have taken a
major financial hit. General Motors, for example, found it necessary last year
to put up $5 billion in cash and to raise billions more through bond offerings
to pump up its retirement fund, according to a report in BusinessWeek.
The government is just as alarmed. In July, a report by
the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, concluded that
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which regulates and insures pension plans
against failure, is in dire financial straits itself. Thanks to corporate
bankruptcies, the PBGC’s reserves have diminished from a $9.7 billion surplus in
2000 to a $3.6 billion deficit in fiscal year 2002, and the number of employees
whose pensions the PBGC had to cover rose from 268,000 in 2001 to 400,000 last
year, according to news reports. Already, some observers are drawing ominous
analogies to the savings-and-loan crisis of the early 1990s, when the federal
government was forced to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to bail out
collapsing S&Ls. "It’s mind-boggling," Longnecker says. "Years ago, I would have
said, sure, there will always be companies with underfunded pensions. But none
of us ever imagined a situation this bad, where the PBGC itself would be in
trouble."
Companies have been lobbying for a legislative fix that
they think would help them to weather the crisis, at least for the short term,
until the stock market recovers and pension funds’ investments can recoup some
of their losses. HR 1776, the Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act,
introduced this past spring by Rep. Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) and Rep. Rob Portman
(R-OH), would do this through bookkeeping. The Cardin-Portman bill would change,
for at least the next three years, the complex method by which the government
calculates corporate pension funds’ liabilities, shifting the standard from
30-year Treasury bonds to the long-term rate for corporate bonds. The practical
result, experts say, would be that companies wouldn’t have to put as much money
into their pension plans to meet the federal standards for being adequately
funded.
Deanna Keim, communications director for the American
Benefits Council, which represents corporate pension plans, says the change
would give a more accurate picture of companies’ pension liabilities. Since the
30-year Treasury bonds were discontinued by the Bush administration, Keim says,
they have an artificially low interest rate and no longer are a fair benchmark.
As a result, she says, companies are being forced to sink too much money into
their funds to comply with federal funding standards. In 2002, according to the
council’s calculations, companies had to contribute $43.5 billion to their
plans--more than they had contributed in the previous three years combined. In
2003, they may have to shell out as much as $83 billion. It’s money that
companies might put to other uses--upgrading their technology, paying workers
instead of laying them off--that could result in higher profits. That, of
course, might ultimately contribute to higher stock prices, which in turn would
lift the value of the assets in pension-fund portfolios.
Critics of the Cardin-Portman bill deride it as
essentially a bookkeeping trick, and warn that over the long run, allowing
companies to make smaller contributions will result in pension plans that are
even more seriously underfunded. "Basically, companies are using this as an
opportunity to reduce their costs," says the Pension Rights Center’s John Hotz.
"But they’re not doing anything about fixing the actual problem, which is just
going to keep on getting worse." Hotz isn’t too sympathetic to companies’
complaints about the financial pressure of pension underfunding. In the 1990s,
he says, many companies took advantage of arcane loopholes in pension
regulations to reduce their payments and even divert surpluses from pension
funds to other uses, making the blithe assumption that the rising stock market
would enable them to cover their obligations. "They’re basically at it again,"
he says. "But this time, the consequences are even more dire for future
retirees."
It’s unclear if the Cardin-Portman bill will make it to
the House floor for a vote, though Keim says that could conceivably happen late
this month. The Bush administration is advocating an even more complicated
alternative, which would use the yield curve of corporate bonds and workers’
ages to calculate a company’s pension liability. But that proposal--which also
includes more stringent reporting requirements for companies with underfunded
plans--has met with a cool reception from business leaders.
If a stalemate develops, Keim says, the result could be
grim. "If we don’t get a solution to this problem, more companies may decide
that in the future they can no longer fund that type of [defined-benefit
pension] plan," she says. "They’d freeze the plans, so their existing employees
wouldn’t receive any more accruement of benefits, and new employees would no
longer get pensions at all." SEI’s survey data backs her up. Nearly a quarter of
the companies polled said they were considering discontinuing their pension
plans and/or replacing them with defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k)
accounts.
Defined-contribution plans, in which companies can pay
into investment accounts controlled by the employees, are advantageous for
companies because they don’t have to continue paying benefits after workers
retire, and because the workers, not the company, assume the risk that the
investments may not generate enough return. As Hotz and others note, employees
tend to have a lot more qualms these days about them, after watching several
years of tumbling stock and mutual fund values. "It all looks so risky to people
now," he says. "They’re realizing how much they want the security of having a
pension plan."
But no matter which scenario plays out, Longnecker expects
that employees’ uncertainty about their pension plans will have troubling
effects on companies. When recruiters talk to job candidates, for example,
they’re going to have to be careful what they tell them about their companies’
retirement benefits, as there’s an increasing chance that the programs will
change. If workers begin to doubt companies’ commitment to providing for their
retirement, they’ll be more inclined to shop elsewhere for a better deal, and
corporate loyalty and retention rates may suffer a serious hit. Other employees,
Longnecker says, may decide that they can’t afford to retire at all, which will
interfere with succession planning. "I’m not sure what the solution is [to
pension underfunding]," he says, "but everyone has to start thinking now about
how they’re going to deal with the impact."